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In this paper we perform an empirical analysis on the relationship between pri-
vate consumption and underground economy for the Italian case. We ﬁnd that pri-
vate market consumption and underground (or hidden) consumption may be deﬁned as
”complementary goods”: an increase in underground consumption tends to rise family
market consumption and increase its marginal utility. An implication of this result is
that the nonmarket sector does not oﬀer hedging opportunities to the consumer-worker
as stressed in Busato and Chiarini (2002) artiﬁcial economy. Moreover, wealth eﬀects
associated with a change in underground consumption are negative. A statistical model
conﬁrms this structural interpretation.
JEL: D11, D12, D18, E21, C52.
1 Introduction
This paper analyzes the implications that a large and growing underground economy
can have on private consumption. 1 In particular, we perform an empirical analysis on
the relationship between aggregate private consumption and the hidden consumption com-
ponent for the Italian case. There are several reasons why we are concerned about this
investigation. First, like most Southern European countries, Italy has a sizeable under-
ground sector, between 24-30% of the GDP. Second, polls and microeconomic studies stress
that almost all the income earned in the hidden sector is immediately spent, producing
an interesting eﬀect on consumer behavior. Third, a recent estimation of the underground
economy for this country uncovers some interesting cyclical properties. A time series plot of
the output of these two sectors for Italy is presented in Figure 1. Casual inspection suggests
that these sectors give rise to two distinct cycles. The ﬁgure reports the Hodrick-Prescott
1Here, we refer to those activities which are not taxed or registered. There exists a vast literature on
this issue. See also Thomas (1992), Feige (1994), Lubell (1991), and the papers in The Economic Journal
symposium (1999) among others. The methods of estimating the size of the underground economy have
recently been surveyed by Schneider and Enste (2000).
1ﬁltered series of the market and the underground components, stressing the countercyclical
nature of the hidden component, and leads one to draw interesting conclusions regarding
the smoothing behavior of agents and the volatility of consumption and income.
The cyclical features of the underground economy have led Busato and Chiarini (2004)
to introduce this sector in a dynamic general equilibrium framework. They show that it
provides a new degree of freedom for enriching the analysis and producing a better under-
standing of business cycle dynamics and policy implications. In this economy, the hidden
consumption (the underground sector) provides an insurance scheme to insure agents against
idiosyncratic risk. Informal markets may be an essential feature in explaining consumption
allocations over states of nature. This insurance channel, alternative to ﬁnancial markets,
is available to people that face, for instance, liquidity constraints.
The goal of this paper is, therefore, to test whether or not the nonmarket sector may
oﬀer hedging opportunities to the consumer-worker. The test may reﬂect a representative
agent who distributes labor supply and income in the two sectors. Alternatively, it may be
consistent with the existence of a contract signed by diﬀerent family members according to
which total income and total labor supply are allocated between the two sectors. To this
end we use a partial-equilibrium model of consumer choice and test the hypothesis of sub-
stitutability for describing the relationship between private and underground consumption.
We perform this test estimating a structural model (Euler equation) and a statistical model
(VAR cointegrated).
HERE FIGURE 1
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a consumer choice model,
stressing the role of marginal utility dynamics determined by the eﬀects of the two con-
sumption (private and hidden) components. This section derives the Euler equation to be
estimated. Section 3 describes the data source and presents the econometric results for
two alternative models: the Euler equation-structural model and a reduced-form statistical
model. Section 4 analyzes the main implications of the ﬁndings in terms of wealth eﬀects.
Conclusions are provided in the ﬁnal section.
2 A Simple Model
This section describes a partial-equilibrium model of consumer choice in the presence
of an underground consumption good. The representative individual inelastically supplies
one unit of labor every period. We may assume that the consumer allocates a share of
the total labor to market production and the remaining, working hours to the underground






2where CT denotes the level of the ”eﬀective” consumption, β is a constant rate of
time preference and u(.) is a time-invariant concave utility function. In an underground
economy, the consumer derives utility from market consumption, Cm, and from underground
produced consumption Cu. The two consumption goods may be conveniently deﬁned as a





Equation (2) implies that a unit of underground goods and services provides the same
utility as λ units of private market consumption.3 The parameter λ is therefore a measure of
the substitutability between the two consumption goods. The greater the parameter λ the
more closely underground consumption substitute for a unit of contemporaneous private
market consumption. The substitution parameter deﬁnes the derivative of the marginal
utility of Cm
t with respect to Cu
t . This value may be positive or negative. A negative value
implies that increases in hidden consumption raise the marginal utility of Cm. That is, the
two consumption aggregates are complementary goods. Thus, when the hidden consump-
tion rises, the consumers are willing to raise market consumption. This interpretation,
consumption aggregates are not rivals, is not consistent with the stylized facts reported
above. On the contrary, a positive value of λ implies that an increase in Cu reduces the
marginal utility of market consumption.
The dynamics of the individual’s assets take the following form:
At+1
(1 + rt+1)





The representative agent holds only a single asset (or a portfolio), At+1 at the beginning
of the period, and wm
t + wu
t is the sum in wage rate he receives within the market and the





t in the ﬂow budget constraint, the optimization problem












2In the subsequent econometric analysis we will assume that the underground economy only produces
consumption goods, and, mostly,that underground revenues are only employed to buy consumption goods.
The consequence is that undeground consumption can be either deﬁned as consumption goods produced in
the underground sector or as consumption goods which are bought using underground revenue.
3We follow Barro (1989) and Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992) who deﬁne a relationship between
consumption services and public consumption, and generalize the expected lifetime utility function (1)
adding an extra-term φ(C
u
t ) where φ is a concave function. With φ(C
u
t ) > 0, the consumer does not
necessarily feel worse oﬀ when C
u
t is increased. Notice that φ(C
u
t ) enters separably in (1) and, therefore,
this term has no bearing on consumers’ choices of consumption: C
u
t is modeled as an exogenous variable.
See also Aschauer (1985) and Karras (1994).
3subject to (3).4 When the utility function features constant relative risk aversion, the




t )−η = (1 + r)β (4)
It is straightforward to show that the Euler equation along with deﬁnition (2) provides







t ) + (Cm
t − Et−1Cm
t ) (5)
where υ = β(1 + r)η. Below we report the empirical analysis using oﬃcial data for the
consumption component and estimates for the underground consumption.
3 Estimation
In this section, to test the degree of substitutability between private consumption and
hidden consumption, we estimate the structural model developed above and a statistical
model (reduced-form) for the variable involved. The empirical speciﬁcations are tested
using data from Istat (National Accounts) for 1970-96. The private consumption data
are an annual series on total family expenditures in real terms Cm
t (exclusive of public
consumption C
p
t and underground consumption Cu
t ). The GDP deﬂator Pt has been used
to generate real consumption aggregates. All the variables are in log terms.
3.1 Underground Estimates
Although a large literature exists on many issues of the underground economy, a set
of alternative estimates for Italy is lacking. Disagreement about deﬁnitions and estimation
procedures is still strong and at the moment there exist few time series for the hidden
component of the GDP. In this study, to measure the relative size of the hidden consumption,
we adopt two diﬀerent series generated by Bovi (1999) and Charini and Marzano (2004).
Bovi has, in his works, generated and updated annual estimates of aggregate underground
economy (1970-1997) based on the currency demand approach. In particular, the unrecorded
economy is generated by a modiﬁed version of Tanzi’s approach (1980; 1983) to better depict
some features of the Italian economy, using a dynamical but uniequational speciﬁcation.5
Charini and Marzano’ s series, as well, are generated using a modiﬁed version of the Tanzi’s
approach, in which the characteristics of non stationarity of the basic series are exploited
through cointegration techinics to generate a quaterly estimation of the italian size of the
undeground economy (1975-1999).
4Here ϕ(.) is the linearly homogeneous aggregator of the two consumption goods.
5See also Bovi and Castellucci (1998). Two additional methods for estimating the underground economy
based on the labor market statistics are reported in Castellucci and Bovi (1999).
4The National Statistic Institute (Istat) is starting to calculate the size of the underground
sector. However, at moment, it is not available a time series but only annual data for few
years (1992 to 2000).
Naturally, there are other possible measures of the hidden economy: disparate estimates
based on questionnaires or experiments or, in some cases, oﬃcial information on aggregate
income-tax-evasion data. However, these data for the unrecorded economy are not revised
or updated and cannot be used in a time series model.
No one of the available estimations of the underground economy, including the oﬃcial
estimates by ISTAT, allow to distinguish, inside the aggregate size of the underground
production/revenue, the share allocated to consumption or investment6. Two possible def-
initions of the underground consumption are available:
consumption goods bought using underground income
consumption goods produced in the underground sector
Nonetheless, to proceed in the empirical analysis, and to get data about the aggregate
underground consumption some further assumptions about its the size are necessary;
following Adam and Ginsburgh (1985) the possible options are:
• total underground output is equal to underground consumption, so that the two def-
initions are equivalent;
• a ﬁxed share of the irregular income/output is consumed/produced by the private
sector, which, again, allows to use both the deﬁnitions;
• the average propensity to consume is identical in the regular and irregular sector,
whcih ﬁts better woth the ﬁrst deﬁnition.
In the proceeding of the paper we adopt the ﬁrst assumption, that is the is the
correspondence between the income generated/earned in the underground economy
and consumption. This adjustment is crude and, moreover, many goods included
in the underground consumption would have durable or investment characteristics.
Nonetheless, this is coherent with data reported in Schneider and Enste (2000) as well
as in Fortin, Lacroix and Montmarquette (2000), and also with the intuition which is
the basis of the currency demand approach (and Tanzi’s approach as well). Actually,
the series of the underground economy estimated by Bovi is founded on an estimation
of the excess of demand of currency, and it is plausible to assume that the estimated
excess of currency is mostly used to allow the trade of consumption goods.
Summing up, the variable deﬁnitions and statistical sources are:
Cm
t =private real consumption expenditure (durable and nondurables goods and ser-
vices). Sources: Istat.
6In general, the lack of micro-data on the features of the underground economy is a well known problem,
and very few studies are available (see for instance Lemieux, Fortin and Frechette, 1994; Fortin, Lacroix and
Montmarquette, 2000).
5Cu
t =total income of the underground economy. In this paper we use the overall income
ﬁgures of the Italian underground economy as consumption series. Of course, this is a ﬁrst
approximation and it reﬂects the fact that at least two-thirds of the income earned in the
underground economy is immediately spent. The ﬁgure derives from polls of some European
countries.7 Sources: Bovi (1999)’s estimation.
All the other variables (the GDP deﬂator Pt and public consumption expenditure C
p
t )
are taken from the Istat/OECD database.
3.2 Structural Estimates
First note that market and nonmarket consumption variables are not stationary se-
ries.8 In this case we know that CT has a unit root and therefore we have υ = 1. The
equation (5) can be estimated under this restriction and, therefore, may be written in
terms of stationary variables ∆Cm
t and ∆Cu
t . Notice that the underground consumption
should be endogenously determined and, of course, it is measured with error. These facts
make the right-hand side variable correlated with disturbances. We use Two Stage Least
Square regression to eliminate the correlation between the underground consumption and





with the estimated covariance matrix Ωtsls = s2 ￿
X′Z(Z′Z)−1(Z′X)
￿−1 , where s2 is the
estimated residual variance, y is the dependent variable, Z the matrix of instrument and X
a vector of explanatory variables.
Furthermore, the use of annual series imposes some time aggregation on (5). In this case,
the regression error is not white noise, but it may follow an MA(1) process. The basic point
is the same as that discussed in the literature on the ”timing of consumption” (see Deaton
1992, Attanasio 1999): this is based on the fact that we have no grounds for supposing
that the annual data that we use here correspond to the period over which consumers
make their decisions. The planning interval may be shorter than the data interval. This
problem, ”induce spurious correlations for adjacent observations of a series that has been
ﬁrst-diﬀerenced”. Notice also that the error term has one-period memory we cannot use
variables dated before t-2.
The parameters estimated for the model ∆Cm
t = γ − λ∆Cu
t + λεt + ξt with εt =
(Cu
t − Et−1Cu
t ) and ξt = (Cm
t − Et−1Cm
t ), are reported in Table 1. For the ﬁrst three
models (models1-3), we do not consider any particular structure for the regression error.
The fourth model reports the parameter estimates after considering the MA(1) process.
Order and rank conditions for identiﬁcation are satisﬁed.9
7See Schneider and Enste (2000) and the works quoted therein.
8The ADF test for Private Consumption is -2.17 whereas, for the Undrground Consumption data, the
ADF statistic is -1.1348. Critical values at 1% and 5% are, respectively, -3.72 and -2.985.
9See, among others, Davidson and MacKinnon (1993).
6None of the Jarque-Bera statistic for testing normality (distributed as χ2(2)), rejects
the null hypothesis of normally distributed errors. For instance, in the estimated model (5)
in the table, the JB statistic is 0.0958 with an associated probability value of 0.953 and
a Kurtosis value of 3.1. In the estimated equations, the Breusch-Godfrey test for second
order serial correlation (p − values in parentheses) does not indicate a signiﬁcant presence
of this phenomenon. Notice that imposing an MA(1) process on the error term does not
improve the stochastic properties of the residuals.
The most interesting result from the table is the robustness of the estimates of λ.
The estimated parameter is negative, statistically signiﬁcant and ranges from .37 to .48. The
estimates indicate that private market consumption and underground consumption may be
deﬁned as ”complementary”, which is to say, an increase in underground consumption tends
to raise the family market consumption and increase its marginal utility.
These ﬁndings do not seem to imply the existence of informal markets in which con-
sumers can insure against idiosyncratic income shocks. This result may be due to the fact
that in good times progressive tax rates in the market economy become higher and boost
the underground economy, introducing a procyclical component into Cu. A further element
should be assessed. Italy and many others Southern European countries, have a high degree
of institutionalization of the traditional family model. A situation where diﬀerent genera-
tions are brought together in the same household. This family structure has the advantage
of oﬀering everyone a sort of protection.10 In this context, family’s members works in dif-
ferent markets and with a diﬀerent status and some of them are willing to accept any kind
of job in any market. When the underground earnings increase, the family’s income as a
whole, increases pushing up its consumption.
HERE TABLE 1
3.3 Reduced Form Estimates
If the random variables are unit root nonstationary and are cointegrated, we can use a
statistical model to ﬁt the data generation mechanism. To this end, the VEC (vector error
correction model) is widely used. This representation always exists when the variables are
cointegrated. Although there have been some attempts to recover structural parameters
from these models, imposing particular restrictions (see Ogaki and Park 1998 and Ogaki
1999), the VEC is a reduced form model and, therefore, it better describes the process
of generating data. Here we use Johansen’s (1988; 1995) Maximum Likelihood method to
estimate the model and provide the impulse-response functions.
The vector error correction model estimated is a bivariate restricted VAR that has a
cointegration vector restriction built into the speciﬁcation:
∆yt = Πyt−1 +
2 X
i=1
Γ∆yt−1 + Bxt + ǫt (7)
10See the papers in Gallie and Paugam (2000) and the works quoted therein.
7where the model follows the standard notation. For our case, y is a 2-vector of nonstationary
I(1) variables, x is a vector of deterministic variables and ǫ is a vector of innovations. The
coeﬃcient matrix Π has reduced rank r < 2, with 2 · r matrices α and β with rank r such
that Π = αβ′ is stationary.
In particular, our VEC speciﬁcation assumes that there are linear trends in the series
and a constant in the cointegrating equation. The assumption made on the deterministic
trends follows one of the possibilities deﬁned by Johansen (1995):
H(r) : Πyt−1 + Bxt = α(β′yt−1 + ρ0 + ρ1t) + α ⊥ γ0 (8)
That is, both the series y and the cointegrating equation have linear trends. The LR test
statistic (trace statistic) rejects the hypothesis of no cointegration but not the hypothesis
of at most one cointegration relation: LR = 21.33 (critical values: 15.4 at 5% and 20.1 at
1%).
The lag order of the VEC is 2 and is estimated for the period 1970-1996 and consists
of changes in private consumption ∆Cm
t and hidden consumption ∆Cu
t ,both in real terms.
The model is conditioned upon a dummy variable for 1975 to account for an outlier and
the public consumption expenditure in real terms.11
The residual covariance matrix shows that the innovations in diﬀerent variables are






This ensures that changing the order of the equation does not dramatically change
the impulse responses. Figures 2-6 report the impulse responses of the two consumption
models. The ﬁrst is a stable bivariate VEC model, where y is a 2-vector of nonstationary
I(1) variables Cm
t and Cu
t , whereas in the second model, public consumption expenditure
C
p
t enters as a further endogenous variable.
Although the dynamics are aﬀected, they yield very similar results. After the distur-
bance in hidden consumption (a standard deviation shock), the private consumption raises
below its preshock level (Figures 2 and 3).12 In Figures 4- 6 the consumption innova-
tions induce the two consumption components to react asymmetrically. In Figure 4 private
consumption responds positively to a one standard innovation in hidden consumption and
public expenditure consumption whereas underground consumption reduces to a one stan-
dard deviation innovation in private consumption. These ﬁndings appear to be robust to
diﬀerent speciﬁcations and do not seem to depend on the ordering of equations.
11Maximum likelihhod assumes that the errors are multivariate normal. The Jarque-Bera statistic does
not reject the hypothesis of normal distribution for the two equations of the model: for the ∆C
m
t equation
the statistic is 0.262, with a p − value of 0.877 (with a Kurtosis value of 3.2) while for the ∆C
u
t equation,
the J.B. is 0.29 (0.864) and the Kurtosis value is 2.62. The ﬁrst equation yields an adjusted R
2 = 0.855
and a standard error of regression S.E. = 0.029. The second equation yields, respectively, R
2 = 0.811 and
S.E. = 0.081.
12As a consequence of the unit root in the model the impulse response function does not return to zero. The
estimated responses of private consumption in ﬁrst diﬀerences taper oﬀ to their initial level. See Lutkepohl
(1993).
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Forecast error variance decompositions of the two variables are reported in Table
2. The table presents the percentage of the variance of each series explained by innovations
in ∆Cm (ﬁrst part of the panel) and the percentage of ∆Cm variance explained by the
shocks in ∆Cu (second part of the panel). The column S.E. is the forecast error of the
variable for each forecast horizon. This error is determined by the changes in the values
of the innovations to each variable in the model. About 43% of the 1-step forecast error
variance of hidden consumption is accounted for by its own innovations and about 56% is
accounted for by private consumption innovations. For 10-step forecast, 86% and 14% of
the error variance is accounted for by hidden and private consumption, respectively. Thus,
for a short forecast horizon, private consumption innovations contribute substantially to the
forecast error variance of underground consumption. Furthermore, the importance of the
hidden consumption shocks increases over the horizon of the simulation: a remarkable and
increasing fraction, from 33% to 79%, of the forecast error variance of private consumption
is accounted for by innovations in the hidden consumption. The ∆Cu innovations explain
more than 67% of the 4-step-ahead forecasting error variance for the private consump-
tion. These results conﬁrm that private and underground consumption are well deﬁned as
complementary goods.
Both the impulse response analysis and the variance decomposition show that the




Using equation (3) for each period starting from t=1, we may write the budget constraint


















Forward substitution in equation (3) shows that the present discounted value of total
consumption is constrained by the level of wealth At plus the present discounted value of
labor earnings in the two sectors of the economy, plus (1 − λ) time the present discounted
value of underground consumption. If | λ |< 1, the underground consumption may impose
a negative (positive) wealth eﬀect on the representative consumer as long as λ < (>)0.
With a constant interest rate and λ > 0, an increase of underground labor income from 0 to
9wu provides an increase in wealth in accordance with the budget constraint. However, our
estimations yield a negative value of λ. In this case, an increase in wu and Cu will produce
a wealth loss.13 This result implies that a country with a large underground economy tends
to have a low private saving ratio.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have presented empirical evidence on the importance of the hidden
consumption for a country with a large underground economy. Using both a structural
model ( Euler equation) and a statistical model (VEC), we show that in Italy, aggregate
hidden consumption is not a rival good for aggregate family private spending. The models
are estimated using oﬃcial (NA) aggregate data, whereas the underground economy used in
the paper has been generated by a model based on the currency demand approach (Tanzi’s
approach). Thus, notwithstanding the robustness of our results, the unoﬃcial character of
the underground variable utilized requires some caution in interpreting these ﬁndings.
Busato and Chiarini (2002) using an artiﬁcial economy characterized by a stochastic
growth model, show that the relationship between private consumption and hidden con-
sumption is relevant to the consumption insurance issue. In an economy with a large
underground sector, consumers might be insured by this alternative (or additional) market
and therefore able to smooth aggregate consumption over states of nature.14 Using a two
sector model in general equilibrium framework, the quoted authors show that this smoothing
out is achieved by switching employment, production and consumption between the market
and underground sectors. In this paper using econometric techniques in a partial equilib-
rium framework, we stress that in economies with a sizeable underground sector, private
and underground consumption are complementary and therefore they tend to change to-
gether. Moreover, the presence of a sizeable underground consumption component produces
negative wealth eﬀects.
Our results indicate that, for economies with a sizeable underground sector, a consump-
tion model that does not explicitly incorporate this sector may be seriously compromised.
Indeed, there exists a substantial diﬀerence between empirical consumption patterns and
theoretical predictions (for instance Attanasio 1999), and this issue can be reasonably tied
to the presence of a nonmarket sector, at least in those countries where this phenomenon
is relevant.
Since the underground economy is an increasingly important phenomenon that arises
in all countries, the evidence of this paper suggests that additional research in this area is
justiﬁed, and can be extended in a variety of ways: the models (both the structural models
and statistical models) might be extended to other variables, and the research should provide
alternative estimations of the underground series. With unoﬃcial data, it is desirable to
carry out comparative analyses.
13Notice that wealth may fall and utility may rise because of the φ(.) term. See footnote n.2 and Barro
(1989).
14For this issue, see for instance, Cochrane (1991).
10These ﬁndings may, to a large extent, due to the underground estimations, the selection
of the variables in the VEC, the imposed exogeneity in the Euler equation, or the cointe-
gration analysis. The structural form is speciﬁed on the basis of a priori knowledge on the
structure of the relationship between the variables of interest, while a major limitation of
our reduced form systems is the potential incompleteness. We work with low-dimensional
VAR systems with potential omitted variables in the innovations.
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